[svlug] Avi Rubin on electronic voting machines

[Bill Selmeier]

Papers were never changed in Chicago????/  Please!  It invariably gets 
down to ethics.  dont expect technology to save or not save you.  It's 
people that make the difference.  Joe, work a poll location!

Bill

On Mon, 19 Dec 2005, Joe Buck wrote:

> Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2005 11:48:04 -0800
> From: Joe Buck <Joe.Buck at synopsys.COM>
> To: Bill Selmeier <bills at right-net.com>
> Cc: Ian MacLure <ibm1130 at sbcglobal.net>, svlug at lists.svlug.org
> Subject: Re: [svlug] Avi Rubin on electronic voting machines
> 
> On Mon, Dec 19, 2005 at 11:09:17AM -0800, Bill Selmeier wrote:
>> Ian, I can't agree and I've worked as a polling inspector (the guy
>> in-charge of a polling precinct per the Regristrar of Voters).  Unless you
>> think the Registrar of Voters is corrupt, and if they are they can corrupt
>> the paper process just as much as the electronic process, the electronic
>> process is much to be preferred.
>
> Democracy depends on the losers agreeing that the winners have won,
> and this is starting to fall apart.  When you have the head of the
> dominant voting machine company declare himself as a partisan, devoted
> to delivering his home state to one candidate, and the machine is an
> untestable black box, it does not suffice to call those upset by this
> a bunch of conspiracy theorists.
>
> The paper process can be cross-checked by doing a recount.  If the
> electronic process is broken, there isn't a way to go back and determine
> voter intent.  Mechanical failures that lose votes are already a known
> problem, even if you refuse to acknowledge the possibility of cheating.
>
> The best solution is an electronic process that has two features:
>
> 1) transparency: every aspect of the flow, including source code, is
>   open to independent inspection.  Without transparency, the registrar
>   of voters has no idea if some third party is changing votes.
>
> 2) "checkability": one way of achieving this is to have the e-voting
>   machine print out a paper copy of the ballot that is both machine-
>   and human-readable, in such a way that the human and the machine
>   read the same information.  The voter checks the paper, and if
>   satisfied, it goes into a locked box to be used for recounts as
>   well as random checks.
>

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